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ABSTRACT
Proof of work, as a widely accepted method, is limited by its low throughput. A significant approach to
overcoming the performance and scalability limitations is to make hybrid blockchains by combining proof
of work with other decentralized systems. The committee-based protocol is proposed to split the overheads
of processing transactions among multiple, smaller groups of nodes to work in parallel to maximize
performance. However, most existing solutions compromise security or decentralization because of the high
demand for hash power in proof of work. We present a novel distributed ledger that preserves long-term
security under permissionless operation. Our design follows the same premise with proof of work but has
low demand for hash power and no limitation for scalability. It ensures security and correctness by many
member exchanges that guarantee the percentage of honest nodes. Our detailed mathematical modeling
and calculation prove the security of the protocol. An evaluation of our experimental prototype shows that
our protocol has the same security as proof of work and can tolerate less than 50% adversaries. Our
experimental results show the effectiveness of our work is the best than the other three popular protocols.
The transaction processing speed is more than ten times that of proof of work. We believe it can be used
widely instead of proof of work in many scenarios.
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1.1 Background and History
Blockchains or distributed ledgers are systems that provide a trustworthy service to a group of nodes or
parties that do not fully trust each other. At their most basic level, they allow a group of users to record
transactions in a shared ledger within that group, with the result that no transaction can be reversed after
it has been released, as long as the blockchain network is operational. The blockchain concept was
combined with many other innovations and computing concepts in 2008 to create modern cryptocurrencies:
electronic cash that is secured by cryptographic processes rather than a central repository or authority.
The fundamental concepts of blockchain technology were first proposed in the late 1980s and early
1990s. Leslie Lamport established the Paxos protocol in 1989 and published a paper [1] in which he
describes a consensus model for achieving agreement on a result in a network of computers where the
computers or network are unreliable. In 1991, an electronic ledger was created using a signed chain of
information [2]. With the introduction of the Bitcoin [3] network in 2009, the first of many modern
cryptocurrencies, this technology became widely recognized. Bitcoin users may digitally sign and pass their
rights to that information to another user, and the Bitcoin blockchain publicly records this transfer,
enabling all network participants to independently check the transactions’ validity. The Bitcoin blockchain
is maintained and run separately by a distributed community of users, making it resistant to subsequent
attempts to tamper the ledger. Many cryptocurrency systems, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum [4], have
been made possible through blockchain technology. As a result, blockchain technology is often associated
with Bitcoin or cryptocurrency solutions in general. The technology, on the other hand, is suitable for a
wider range of applications and is being studied in a number of industries.
1.2 Blockchain Security
Since Bitcoin was a pseudonymous currency, it was important to have processes in place to establish
trust in a setting where users could not be easily identified. In traditional approaches, this trust was
usually conveyed through trusted intermediaries on both sides. Within a blockchain network, the required
trust is allowed by its high security in the absence of trusted intermediaries. Blockchains are
cryptographically secure, ensuring that the data in the ledger has not been tampered with and that the
data is verifiable. Here we use Bitcoin as an example to show how the system gains the trust from users.
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Figure 1.1 Structure of Bitcoin.
In Figure 1.1, the blockchain is a linked list which contains data and a hash pointer which points to its
previous block. Transactions are bundled into blocks and validated by a proof-of-work. A block is valid if
its cryptographic hash contains d leading zero bits, with the difficulty parameter d being modified on a
regular basis to ensure that new blocks are mined every ten minutes on average. A Merkle tree of new
transactions to be committed is included in each block, as well as a cryptographic hash chaining to the last
valid block, creating the blockchain. After successfully creating a new block with a valid proof-of-work, a
node broadcasts the new block to the rest of the nodes, who approve it if it extends a valid chain strictly
longer than any they have seen previously.
Bitcoin’s decentralized consensus and security are built on the presumption that the majority of nodes,
as measured by hash power or ability to solve hash-based proof of work puzzles, obey these rules and
always try to extend the longest chain. A quorum of nodes with the majority of the network’s hash power
accepts a block by mining on top of it, and the block is inserted in any subsequent chain. The fact that
this majority will be expanding the legal chain faster than any dishonest minority that could try to rewrite
history or double-spend currency ensures Bitcoin’s stability. Although Bitcoin’s consistency guarantee is
only probabilistic, the popularity of digital currencies proves the safety of this mechanism
However, Bitcoin’s consistency guarantee, proof-of-work leads to two problems. First, it is no friendly
for ordinary people. The demand for hash power for a block has reached the gigabit level. Ordinary
electronic equipment is completely incapable. In the fierce competition, only one node benefits at one
block. Second, the maximum size of a Bitcoin block is actually 1 MB. This restriction imposes an upper
limit on the amount of transactions per second (TPS) that the Bitcoin network can accommodate, which is
estimated to be about 7 TPS on average. Hence, [5] introduces sharding, an cooperative protocol, which is
a method that splits the database into several shards, and each shard is maintained parallelly to increase
the system efficiency and expand the scalability of the system. But the security becomes a big problem
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since each shard need a specific mechanism to defend attackers. The bloated mutual authentication
mechanism of members in each shard will reduce the overall efficiency.
1.3 ThermoEquil Protocol
This paper proposes ThermoEquil protocol, a new type of blockchain framework with the advantages of
both classical and cooperative blockchain systems. The ThermoEquil protocol follows the premise of the
Bitcoin that the majority of the nodes in the Internet are honest and obey rules. Meanwhile, the
ThermoEquil protocol works like a cooperative blockchain protocol, where many nodes can involve and
benefit from the system. The ThermoEquil protocol makes use of environmental characteristics to ensure
the security of the system, which reduces hash power requirements for honest users and increases the
difficulty for malicious users to attack by its specific mechanism. We modeled ThermoEquil protocol
mathematically and got the theoretical results. Then ThermoEquil-chain is designed based on our
theoretical resutls. At last, experiments with a prototype implementation of ThermoEquil-chain show that
our experimental results are in line with theoretical predictions and have high security.
1.4 Contents and Contributions of This Thesis
This remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents further related work that
informs our approach. Chapter 3 introduces the mathematically model of ThermoEquil protocol and
theoretical performance. Chapter 4 presents ThermoEquil-Chain the design of a permissionless blockchain.
Chapter 5 shows the experiments of ThermoEquil-chain. Chapter 6 gives the conclusion from the results of




In this section, we present an overview of state-of-the-art of blockchain. Although more and more
blockchain models have been developed, only a few block chains can be used, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum.
We review two categories of blockchain consensus protocols: classical and sharding-based protocols. Then,
we illustrate their negative impacts which motivates us to devise the ThermoEquil to tolerate these issues.
2.1 Classical Protocols
In classical protocols, only one node wins the game at a time. Proof of work consensus is a typical
classical protocol, because only one node’s block is added to the chain at a time. The main mechanism of
proof of work has been discussed in 1.2.
2.1.1 Proof of Stake Protocol
The proof of stake (PoS) model is based on the premise that the more invested an user is in a system,
the more likely they want it to succeed and less likely they want to subvert it. Stake refers to the sum of
cryptocurrency a blockchain network user has put into the system. The cryptocurrency can no longer be
invested after it has been staked. The amount of stake an user has determines whether or not new blocks
are published in proof of stake blockchain networks. As a result, the probability of a blockchain network
user publishing a new block is proportional to their stake in relation to the total amount of staked
cryptocurrency in the blockchain network.
In [6], proof of stake is proposed to free the nodes from performing resource intensive computations as
found in proof of work. However, there are many papers [7],[8],[9] questioning its security. Under proof of
stake systems, the “rich nodes” can more easily stake more of the digital assets, earning themselves more
digital assets or to obtain the majority of digital assets within a system to “control” it is generally cost
prohibitive.
2.1.2 Proof of Authority Protocol
The proof of authority consensus model [10] is based on publishing nodes’ partial confidence based on
their established relation to real-world identities. Under the blockchain network, publishing nodes must
have their identities proven and verifiable. The publishing node stakes its identity/reputation in order to
publish new blocks. Users on the blockchain network have a direct impact on a publishing node’s
reputation based on the actions of the publishing node. The less reputation you have, the less likely you
4
are to be able to publish a block. As a result, it is in a publishing node’s best interests to retain a good
reputation. This protocol has the same problem with the proof of stake. Moreover, it needs additional
encryption mechanism to ensure that the reputation record is correct.
2.2 Cooperative protocols
In recent years, some papers focus on expanding the throughput and introduce solutions to the
scalability problem of blockchain. A single consensus node suffers from poor performance as well as safety
limitations such as weak consistency and low fault-tolerance. A promising approach to increase the
throughput is to use cooperative protocol [11]. Cooperative protocol is firstly used in a distributed database
[5], whereby a database is partitioned into several pieces and placed on different servers. In the context of a
public blockchain, the set of nodes is partitioned into multiple smaller groups (called shards) that work in
parallel on disjoint transactions and maintain the disjoint ledger, which is often referred to as transaction
sharding and state sharding respectively. By enabling parallelization of consensus and storage, cooperative
protocol [12] can scale the throughput of the system proportional to the number of shards and decrease the
per-node storage requirements, greatly improve performances and efficiencies of blockchain. Here we review
recent progress of cooperative protocol and point out the weakness of these methods in security.
2.2.1 RSCoin
[13] propose RSCoin, a sharding-based technique to make centrally-banked cryptocurrencies scalable.
While RSCoin describes an intriguing approach to combining a centralized monetary supply with a
distributed network to bring transparency and pseudonymity to the conventional banking system, its
blockchain protocol is not decentralized because it relies on a trusted source of randomness for sharding of
validator nodes (known as mintettes) and transaction auditing. Furthermore, RSCoin uses a two-phase
commit protocol that is executed within each shard, which is unfortunately not Byzantine fault tolerant
and can be used by a colluding adversary to commit double-spending attacks.
2.2.2 Elastico
[5] the first sharding-based consensus protocol for public blockchains. Each participant solves a PoW
puzzle based on an epoch randomness obtained from the blockchain’s last state in each consensus epoch.
The least-significant parts of the PoW are used to decide the committees that will work together to process
transactions.
Although Elastico can increase Bitcoin’s throughput and latency by several orders of magnitude, it is
not without flaws: (1) In “every” epoch, Elastico allows all parties to re-establish their identities and
rebuild all committees. Aside from a substantial communication overhead, this results in significant latency
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that scales linearly with network size, as the protocol takes more time to solve enough PoWs to fill all
committees; (2) Elastico allows a limited committee size (around 100 parties) in practice to keep the
overhead of running PBFT in each committee to a minimum. Unfortunately, this dramatically increases
the protocol’s failure rate, which, according to a simple analysis, may be as high as 0.97 after just six
epochs, making the protocol entirely insecure in operation. (3) While Elastico allows each party to only
validate a subset of transactions, it must still broadcast all blocks to all parties and force each party to
store the entire ledger; (4) Finally, even with a high failure probability, Elastico can only tolerate up to a
1/4 fraction of defective parties. This low resiliency bound is required by Elastico in order to allow for
realistic committee sizes.
2.2.3 OmniLedger
In a more recent work, [14] propose OmniLedger, a sharding-based distributed ledger protocol that
attempts to fix some of the issues of Elastico. The protocol runs a global reconfiguration protocol every
epoch (about once a day) to enable new participants to join the protocol, assuming a slowly-adaptive
adversary that can corrupt up to a 1/4 fraction of the nodes at the start of each epoch.
The protocol uses a slow identity blockchain protocol that assumes synchronous channels to create
identities and delegate participants to committees. In each epoch, a new random number is generated
using a bias-resistant random generation protocol that uses a verifiable random function (VRF) [15] for
unpredictable leader election, similar to Algorand’s lottery algorithm [16]. The consensus protocol uses a
variant of ByzCoin [17] to achieve quick consensus over partially-synchronous channels. Epoch randomness
is often used to break a committee into smaller groups. In the Byzantine environment, the ByzCoin
architecture is known to have many security/performance issues [18] [19], notably that it falls back to
all-to-all communication. Regrettably, due to the new scheme’s incomplete (and changing) specification, it
is uncertain how the new scheme used in OmniLedger would fix these issues.
Furthermore, OmniLedger leaves a number of problems unsolved: (1) OmniLedger, like Elastico, can
only withstand t < n/4 corruptions. In reality, when t < n/8; the protocol can only achieve a low latency
(less than 10 seconds). (2) To ”seed” the VRF in the first epoch, OmniLedger needs a trustworthy setup to
produce an initial unpredictable configuration. (3) OmniLedger allows the user to actively engage in
cross-shard transactions, which is a clear assumption for most light-weight users; (5) Finally, OmniLedger
appears vulnerable to DoS attacks by a malicious user who can lock arbitrary transactions using the
atomic cross-shard protocol.
When t < n/4, OmniLedger can only achieve a high throughput by using an optimistic trust-but-verify
method to balance throughput and transaction confirmation latency. A collection of positive validators
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processes transactions rapidly and provides provisional commitments that are later checked by a set of core
validators in this method. Although such an approach appears to be useful in some situations, such as
micropayments, where low-stake small transactions must be processed quickly, it can be considered a
high-risk approach in routine payments, particularly given the lack of financial liability frameworks in
today’s decentralized systems. However, every blockchain protocol (including Bitcoin’s) has a transaction




In this section, the second law of thermodynamics [20] is first introduced, since which inspired the
ThermoEquil protocol. Then a mathematical model of ThermoEquil protocol is illustrated and some
simulations are conducted at last.
3.1 Second Law of Thermodynamics
The Second Law of Thermodynamics [20]: Heat transfer occurs spontaneously from higher to lower
temperature bodies but never spontaneously in the reverse direction. The law states that it is impossible
for any process to have as its sole result heat transfer from a cooler to a hotter object.
Figure 3.1 The Second Law of Thermodynamics [21]
Figure 3.1 shows the thermal conduction where the heat flow comes from hot side to the cold side. The
heat conduction stops when the two sides become same temperature. The essential reason of thermal
conduction is the transfer of internal energy by microscopic collisions of particles and movement of
electrons within a body. Based on the solid state physics, the law of heat conduction, also known as
Fourier’s law [22] 3.1, states that the rate of heat transfer through a material is proportional to the negative
gradient in the temperature and to the area, at right angles to that gradient, through which the heat flows.
q = −k▽T (3.1)
where q is the local heat flux density, k is the material’s conductivity , ▽T is the temperature gradient .
Here an example Figure 3.2(A) is introduced to show how the equation works. Room A are in the
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temperature T1. Object A in the temperature T2 are put in room A. Assume the temperature of room will
not be affected by A. The temperature of these two objects will be shown as Figure 3.2(B).
Figure 3.2 Temperature changes of the object.
In Figure 3.2(B), A becomes same temperature in t seconds which are also called relaxation time.
3.2 ThermoEquil Protocol.
As shown in Figure 3.3, there is a committee constructed by several nodes in the blockchain network.
Here we suppose the percentage of honest nodes in committee is γ1 and the percentage of the blockchain
network is γ2(γ1 < γ2). Then the nodes in committee are randomly selected and exchanged with the nodes
in the blockchain network. Here we have a guess as Fourier’s law.
• The percentage of attackers in committee should be decrease and close to the percentage in the
blockchain network. The decrease stops until γ1
.
= γ2.
• After the system become equilibrium, the member exchanges will not affect the system any more.
The system should keep γ1
.
= γ2.
Based on these guesses, the percentage of honest in committee should finally become same as the
blockchain network.
9
Figure 3.3 Example of how ThermoEquil works
It is mentioned that in all public blockchain model, the percentage of honest is bigger than 50%. Then
it can be guaranteed that the percentage of honest nodes in the committee should be bigger than 50%
through member exchanges. The committee could be used to build blockchain. But first the guess needs to
be proven.
3.3 Mathematical Proof
In Figure 3.4, there are γ percentage honest nodes in the blockchain network. The committee has k
members and will exchange 1 members every second.
Each exchange is considered as independent and separate for the calculation. Then the whole model
could be described as a Markov model[23]. A Markov chain is a mathematical system that experiences
transitions from one state to another according to certain probabilistic rules. The defining characteristic of
a Markov chain [24] is that no matter how the process arrived at its present state, the possible future states
are fixed. In Figure 3.5, the possible future committee states are fixed based on the present committee’s
honest and malicious members. So each committee state can be described as a Markov chain state. All the
committees states form a Markov model.
The states are S0, S1...Si...Sk.(i means the number of honest nodes in the committee.) Each time, the
Markov chain moves one step. The committee that exchanges n members need to move n steps.
10
Figure 3.4 Mathematical model of ThermoEquil.
For each state, there are three possible future states:
• Si → Si: A honest node is exchanged with an honest node. Or a malicious node is exchanged with a
malicious node. ρi is the possibility of occurrence.
• Si → Si−1: A honest node is exchanged with an malicious node. ζi is the possibility of occurrence.
• Si → Si+1: A malicious node is exchanged with a honest node. ηi is the possibility of occurrence.
The changes of state of the system are called transitions. The probabilities associated with various state
changes are called transition probabilities. The process is characterized by a state space, a transition
matrix describing the probabilities of particular transitions, and an initial state (or initial distribution)








ρ0,0 η0,1 0 ... ... 0
ξ1,0 ρ1,1 η1,2 ... ... 0
0 ξ2,1 ρ2,2 η2,3 ... 0
... ... ... ... ... ...








The transition matrix for a Markov chain is a stochastic matrix whose (i, j) entry gives the probability
that an element moves from the jth state to the ith state during the next step of the process. The ith state
means there are i honest miners in the committee.
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From the matrix, it can be seen that P (Si → Si+1) is bigger than P (Si → Si−1) when current honest
percentage is smaller than the blockchain network, otherwise the opposite. The system is affected by the
percentage of honest nodes difference between inside and outside. This proves that partial of the guess is
correct. With the transition matrix, the state of the model can be predicted. Here vector
V = (v1, ...vi....vn)(if i = m, vi = 1,else vi = 0) present the state of Sm. Every round w members are
exchanged and there are t rounds. The probable states of the system after wt steps can be described as:
12
P = V Twt (3.6)
Here each pi in P is the probability that system stops in Si.
With the help of 3.6, the expected honest nodes left in the system can be calculated:
E(I) = NTwt (3.7)
E(I) is the expected number of the honest nodes. N(n1, ...ni, ...)(if i = m,ni = m, else ni = 0) present
numbers of nodes in the state. k is the size of the committee. Then difference operation of the above
formula is carried out about t.
dE(I) = dNTwt (3.8)













The rightmost term represents the percentage gradient on each node. Then the curves have been shown
in Figure 3.6.
This equation and Figure 3.1 exactly proves our first guess and shows that the whole system should
become the same percentage as the blockchain network.
Then it is necessary to know how the percentage of the honest nodes in the committee changes when it
becomes same with the blockchain network. From the transition matrix, it is known that all the states in
the chain are ergodic. It needs finite steps to travel from one state Si to another state Sj . Hence this
Markov chain must has a stationary distribution [26]. The stationary distribution is important which
shows the stationary distribution of the system. The stationary distribution of a Markov chain describes
the states’ distribution after a sufficiently long time that the distribution does not change any longer.
Stationary distribution:
Π = (π1, π2, ...πk) (3.11)
13
Figure 3.6 Percentage change of honest nodes in committee.
Here πi shows the probability that there are i honest miners in the committee when the system is
stationary. We have:
Π = ΠT (3.12)
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... ... ... ... ... ...






















Here is an example of stationary distribution when k = 100000 in Figure 3.7
The result is very similar to norm distribution and the expected value is γ. Thus we have proved our
second guess.
Furthermore, the probability that the honest nodes in the committee are still the majority after many
exchanges could be described as:
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Figure 3.7 Stationary distribution (k=100000).




Then we can get:















This will help us to determine the size of the committee.
3.4 Committee Size and Exchange Times
Base on the calculation, a simulation is conducted by Matlab. In the simulation, there are 200 members
in the committee whose percentage of honest nodes start from 0%, 50% and 100%. Each time 60 members
are exchanged with the blockchain network. The percentage of honest nodes in the blockchain network is
15
0.5625%. First use our theory is used to calculate the probability that is more than half of the honest
nodes in the committee after each exchange. Since the honest nodes in the committee are in the majority
to stop malicious attacks, this probability is also the rate of successful attack defense. Then we simulate
the process, create a committee and randomly exchange members according to the theoretical steps.
Finally, we draw the theoretical results and simulation results in Figure 3.8. The simulation results are
very close to the theoretical results. Now we have proven our guess is correct.
Figure 3.8 Simulation and theory results.
From 3.14, the stationary distribution is a function of k. The stationary distribution when k is
80, 200, 400, 800 and 100000 has been shown in Figure 3.9.
It can be seen the stationary distributions are very close to normal distribution. When k is small(80),
the variance of the distribution is large which will increase system instability. When k is big(100000), the
variance of the distribution is small. But the system operation cost will be significantly increased. So we
think that k from 200 to 1000 is a reasonable value.
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Figure 3.9 Stationary distribution when k is 80, 200, 400, 800 and 100000.
We inspired from the nature to determine the exchange rate c in our model. We hope that the system
can be stable even when the outside world changes violently. So we refer to some low thermal conductivity
(wood, glass) objects in our life. If an object has m molecules, the temperature of the object will change
one degree after m/3 effective molecular collision with the environment. Therefore, the number of members
for each exchange should be greater than k/3. According to the previous formula, the number of honest
people changes about 2%− 3% in each round. Hence, it always takes twenty to fifty rounds to reach the
stationary state.
If the percentage of the honest nodes in the blockchain network is big, ThermoEquil will never fail.
However, if the percentage of the honest nodes in the blockchain network is close to 50%, then there is a
probablity that ThermoEquil fails.




1− P (γh > 50%)
(3.17)
Based on 3.17, the relationship between committee size k and honest percentage in the blockchain





Hence the size of committee should be not too small. Based on our simulation, it should be larger than





The major components in ThermoEquil-Chain are shown in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1 Major components in ThermoEquil-Chain.
In the blockchain network, there are nodes and a committee called ThermoEquil committee constructed
by nodes. The users of ThermoEquil-Chain are broadcasting their transactions which contain the trading
records. The different with other blockchain system is that if a new node wants to join which needs to
broadcast itself to let committee nodes know it. The committee members collect transactions sent by users
in the network and filter out valid ones. We modify RAFT protocol and introduce ThermoEquil protocol
for the committee to maintain the ThermoEquil-chain. To generate a new block, a leader in the committee
will be selected by ThermoEquil protocol to generate a new block and be in charge of the member
exchange. If the new block and member exchange plan are verified and confirmed by sufficient members,
the leader will publish this block and add it to the ThermoEquil-chain. After that, the committee
exchanges members with the blockchain network follows the leader’s plan to ensure security and start to
select next leader. If the new block or member exchange plan are denied by sufficient members, the
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committee will abandon the leader and start to select next leader. This is how the ThermoEquil committee
maintains the ThermoEquil-Chain.
4.2 Network and Threat Model
For the underlying network, we make the same assumption as prior work [12],[14], [28]. Specifically, we
assume that honest miners’ network is well connected and that the communication channels between
honest validators are synchronous.
We adopt a realistic setting by assuming the adversary can reach 50%. Compared to the previous works
25% or 33% [12],[14], this threat model is more practical. These malicious nodes can behave arbitrarily,
e.g., they might refuse to participate or collude to attack the system. The remaining validators are honest
and faithfully follow the protocol. We further assume that the adversary is computationally bounded, that
cryptographic primitives are secure, and that the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard.
4.3 ThermoEquil protocol
ThermoEquil protocol is inspired by the classical RAFT protocol [29],[30]. RAFT is a consensus
algorithm for managing a replicated log. Every distributed system needs to replicate the state in order to
get the resilient tag for a distributed system. Almost every resilient distributed system implements the
RAFT protocol.
Figure 4.2 ThermoEquil protocol.
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The main steps in ThermoEquil protocol are shown in Figure 4.2. In the whole process, the nodes are
keeping collecting message from users and new nodes.
Figure 4.3 Leader selection.
When ThermoEquil protocol initializes, the first step is to select a leader shown in Figure 4.3. In this
step, a new term starts in the committee. A term is an specified period of time for which a new leader
needs to be elected. The term changes with the number of the follower. The more followers, the longer the
term. Each term starts with a leader election. If the election is completed successfully (i.e., a single leader
is elected) the term keeps going with normal operations orchestrated by the new leader. If the election is a
failure, a new term starts, with a new election. There are three states of the node: follower, candidate and
leader. A leader election is started by a candidate node. A node becomes a candidate if it receives no
communication by the leader over a period called the election timeout, so it assumes there is no acting
leader anymore. It starts the election by increasing the term counter, voting for itself as new leader, and
sending a message to all other nodes requesting their vote. A node will vote only once per term, on a
first-come-first-served basis. If a candidate receives a message from another node with a term number
larger than the candidate’s current term, then the candidate’s election is defeated and the candidate
changes into a follower and recognizes the leader as legitimate. If a candidate receives a majority (half of
the committee) of votes, then it becomes the new leader and start next step. If neither happens, e.g.,
because of a split vote, then a new term starts, and a new election begins.
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In the new block proposal step, the leader is responsible for the new block and member exchange plan.
It creates a new block with the transaction it collects then transmits the block to all followers. Once the
leader receives confirmation messages from the majority of its followers, the committee moves to next step.
If the followers found the leader cheated, then it moves back to step one.
Here secondary encryption is introduced to ensure security of the system when followers sent
confirmation messages. When a follower confirmed the new block, it will send a randomly generated string
of 2 or specific digits with its signature. This operation could introduce more uncertainty and increase the
cost of the attack.
After the leader got enough confirmation, it begins to make member exchange plan (ME plan) based on
the member exchange algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Member Exchange Algorithm
/* This function return the list of the new committee.*/
/* Hash() is the hash function */
Input:
The set of current committee members, COM ;
The set of candidate members in previous cycle, CAM ;
The data of new generated block, B;
The number of exchanges,n
Output:
The set after member exchange, new COM ;
1: Create a temporary container to store the contents of the new block, TEM = B;
2: Find the member x ∈ COM such that |Hash(x.ID)−Hash(TEM)| has the smallest value;
3: Remove x in COM ;
4: Add x to CAN ;
5: TEM = TEM + x.ID;
6: Find the member y ∈ CAN such that |Hash(y.ID)−Hash(TEM)| has the smallest value;
7: Add y to COM
8: Remove y in CAN ;
9: TEM = TEM + y.ID;
10: Repeat line 2 to line 8 for n− 1 times;
11: return COM ;
In the algorithm, the candidate list contains only those collected in the previous cycle to prevent
attacks. Then our algorithm uses the member’s ID to increase the randomness of the result. Combined
with the secondary encryption, the result is difficult to predict.
Once all followers learn and confirm the ME plan, the leader publish and add the block to the
ThermoEquil-Chain. Then the committee exchanges members with the blockchain network follow the




4.4.1 Security in Member Exchange
In previous section, the results show that the percentage of honest nodes in the committee after
member exchange will be very close to the percentage of that in the blockchain network. In the ME plan
carryout step of ThermoEquil protocol, the committee exchanges members with the blockchain network.
According to our results, after this step, the percentage of the honest nodes in new committee γnew should
be close to that of the blockchain network γ. In the threaten model, we assume γ > 50%. Hence,
γnew > 50% When the new committee start to elect leader, the majority are the honest nodes. Thus our
protocol is almost unbreakable.
4.4.2 Security in Secondary Encryption
If the adversary has a considerable hash power, predicting the new committee members will be possible
in next cycle. It is possible to predict the transactions in the next blocks and create new nodes who could
be swapped into the new committee. The secondary encryption makes it impossible to predict the member
exchange step. For example, if there are k members in the committee and the secondary encryption has 2
ASCII digits, the required hash power will increase:
H = (2 ∗m)256 (4.1)
If k is 200, it takes one minutes to calculate even the adversary control half the hash power of the entire





The main research goal of our study is to assess our protocol. First, we use experiment to prove the
correctness of our protocol. Then we need to verify whether the larger the k, the more stable the system.
At last, we will compare our protocol with other blockchain solutions.
5.2 Experiment Design
In order to study the performance of ThermoEquil protocol, we implemented a prototype of
ThermoEquil chain in 1k lines of Python code. The implementation consists of two components: a
supervisor and a node. The supervisor is responsible for monitoring the operation of the node and some
operations at the beginning of the system. Each node is the subject of operating ThermoEquil protocol
and also the user which can broadcast transactions. Each node has specified the attribute of honesty at the
beginning and can will randomly change their ID as a new node or change their honest attribute to ensure
the percentage of the honest nodes in the blockchain network. We deployments our code on a computer
containing 4 GB of RAM and running window 10.
The pseudo code is shown in Figure 5.1. In the beginning, the code will create supervisor, honest nodes
and cheater nodes. Then the supervisor randomly select k honest nodes to construct the genesis committee
to generate the genesis block. Then the nodes and the committee keep running the ThermoEquil protocol
to generate blocks. Whenever a new block is generated, the corresponding leader will output the following
information in Figure 5.2:
The supervisor will stop the code until 1000 blocks are generated or the honest node in the committee
are not the majority.
5.3 Results
In the first experiment, we want to check the relationship between committee size and system stability.
The size of committee are 200 and a800. The total nodes number is 100000 and the honest percentage is
80% in the blockchain network. We repeated the experiment 100 times, and each time the supervisor
recorded the current change in the number of the honest nodes. The results are shown in Figure 5.3.
This proves our theory and we found a factor that the part of the experimental distribution that is
greater than the honest probability of the blockchain network (80%) is smaller than the theoretical one.
This may be caused by insufficient of the computer randomness. But it has little affect on the entire system
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Figure 5.1 Pseudo code flowchart.
In the second experiment, we want to check the ability of the system for defense against attacks. The
size of committee are 200. The total nodes number is 100000 and the honest percentage is changing from
55% to 100% in the blockchain network. We repeated the experiment 100 times for each scenarios, and
recorded the probability of successfully producing 1000 blocks. The results shows in Figure 5.4.
The result shows when the percentage of honest nodes in the blockchain network is bigger than 80% the
system has a high security. With the decrease of the percentage of honest nodes in the blockchain network
the system become unstable. The experiments result is not good as the theory one. When the increase of
the dishonest nodes in the blockchain network, the system becomes more and more vulnerable. The reason
is that the algorithm to generate ME plan is not really “random”. This problem will be discussed in the
next section.
At last, we compare the performance between different protocols. The results is shown in Table 5.1.
Our protocol has a very good performance than other three protocol.
Table 5.1 Performance comparison of different protocols.
PoW PoS PBFT ThermoEquil
Mean time to process a transition 542(ms) 188(ms) 18(ms) 15(ms)
Adversary tolerance 1/2 1/2 1/3 1/2
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Figure 5.2 Code output.
26
Figure 5.3 Experiment and theory results when k=200 and 800.
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ThermoEquil has limitations that we want to address in future work.
First, it is necessary to improve the member exchange algorithm. In theory model, the probability for
each node in the Internet to be selected should be equal and independent. Each selection is in accordance
with the geometric distribution [31]. However, in our algorithm, only the first time is“real random”. If we
know the result of the first exchange, it is easy to predict the whole ME plan. The system is in accordance
with the hypergeometric distribution [32] not geometric distribution.
Second, it is important to develop a mechanism for nodes to communicate large messages. In our
prototype, all the experiments carries out in one computer and each node use message passing function
built in Python. So it is hard to assess the impact of the communication between nodes. In [33] and [34],
For the blockchain, the network transmission speed has been a problem that can not be ignored.
At last, we look forward to the future application of this technology
• Semi-public Blockchain
Semi-public blockchain is believed as a future trend. [35] and [36] introduce the notion of
semi-permissioned blockchains where only members will have their transactions processed, but where
these transactions can be publicly validated. However, it is still not fair for the users since everyone
want to involve.
With the ThermoEquil, the entities can control partial of the committee and give the opportunities
to all the users in the Internet. The only thing to do is to ensure that the proportion of members in
the committee is in a situation where no one has the privilege.
• Sharding-based ThermoEquil
Recently, sharding technique is always used in blockchain systems, such as [37] and [38] Many
researchers consider this technology as the best way to solve scalable problem in blockchain. If we




Thermoequil is the first blockchain framework that securely frees nodes from additional requirement for
generating blocks while preserving full decentralization and protecting against a Byzantine adversary.
Thermoequil achieves this through a novel approach consisting of three steps. First, it uses the percentage
of honest nodes in the blockchain network to keep the majority of the committee is honest. Second,
Thermoequil modified RAFT protocol as a communication tool for the committee to generate blocks.
We implemented and evaluated Thermoequil-Chain and each of its sub-components. We evaluated the
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